16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SOMERSET, PENNSYLVANIA

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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF SOMERSET COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA



MARY JO TAKACS AND JAMES LYONS) NO. 1122 CIVIL 2009
VS) PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL)
INDIAN LAKE BOROUGH)) ARGUMENT

APPEARANCES:

PLAINTIFFS:

ROBERT P. GING, JR., ESQ.;

CONFLUENCE, PA

DEFENDANT:

DANIEL W. RULLO, ESQ.;

SOMERSET, PA

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE DAVID C. KLEMENTIK, JUDG

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
ARGUMENT

HELD ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2009

IN COURTROOM NO. 1

SOMERSET COUNTY COURTHOUSE

SOMERSET, PENNSYLVANIA 15501.



1 FRI., DEC. 4, 2009 - 1:13 P.M. - CRM.#1 - #1122 CIVIL 2009 2 PRESIDENT JUDGE JOHN M. CASCIO 3 4 THE COURT: Afternoon. 5 MR. GING: Afternoon, Your Honor. 6 MR. RULLO: Afternoon. 7 THE COURT: We have specially scheduled an 8 argument on amended objections, preliminary objections, to a 9 local agency appeal; and, I certainly recognize that there 10 01:14 was an original round of preliminary objections. There was an amendment as of right, and then there was a second round 11 12 of preliminary objections; and, that's why we're here. So, 13 Attorney Rullo? 14 MR. RULLO: Thank you, Judge. Judge, we are 15 here on preliminary objections to the appellant's appeal, and 16 it deals with issues that we believe have previously been 17 determined by this Court, and if I may take a moment just for the record to make sure that we are completely on board with 18 19 where we are. 20 01:14 This is an action filed by Mary Jo Takacs 21 for which she's appealed the preliminary adjudication, what 22 she contends is an adjudication -- the Borough Council is 23 holding a vote -- by the Borough Council made on September the 9th, 2009. And, that -- that vote was taken pursuant to 24 25 an interlocutory order that this Court made or entered on

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August 26th, 2009, in the case of Jack Butler, et al, including Mary Jo Takacs as one of the appellants, versus Indian Lake Borough, filed at Number 860 Civil 2007.

Our preliminary objections indicate that we believe that the appeal should be dismissed in that it fails to -- the appellant has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and there's a number of reasons why we allege that.

Mrs. Takacs clearly was a party to the action in Number 860 Civil 2007, and there has been a final order that was entered which resolved with prejudice the claims taken by the Borough Council in approval of an easement that did not violate the borough code or the administrative agency law.

My understanding is that there has been an appeal filed to the Commonwealth Court by Mrs. Takacs and others, but the final order was entered by this Court; and, we have filed a cross-appeal dealing with the issue of the sunshine law violation because, not knowing exactly what in fact will occur in the Commonwealth Court, we protected our rights.

The new appeal that is filed here raises the question again of the same issues that were raised in 860 Civil 2009. Based upon the Court's determination that there was a violation of the spirit of the sunshine law, it re -- it

required us under the interlocutory order to take action at a public meeting to determine whether we ratify or not ratify the action taken by the board in 2007; and, that, that date had been August the 8th, 2007. The first meeting following the Court's interlocutory order was the meeting that we held on September 9th.

At that time, in an open public session, Mr. Ging appeared on behalf of Mrs. Takacs, I believe and potentially others, and posed a offer by letter that he attaches to this petition to lease or purchase the land that is the subject matter of the easement.

Now, this land is the land that is owned by the Borough. It is inundated by the water of Indian Lake, and it is located at the shoreline of the property owned by St. Clair Resorts, L.L.C.

So, prior to any action taken, there was this discussion about the presentation of the offer to lease or purchase. And, I took the position there, and that is correctly so under the Borough code, it is different than easement, that potentially -- or, a lease or a sale would require competitive bidding, would require a different process than was done and that in fact council discussed in open session that they don't sell or lease land in front of other people's property. There is the -- the permissive use is that land for the shoreline so that the -- the dominant

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tenant essentially has the ability to access the waterway at its shoreline.

And, it didn't -- did not take any action on

that the interlocutory order specifically addressed, and that is whether or not there should be a ratification of the action

this proposal to buy or lease. It focused on the question

taken in 2007.

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Mr. Ging in his appeal, in addition to the issues that I'll address in a moment, took the liberty of suggesting that somehow the Solicitor, me, had championed according to what his determination — well, use of language was, championed the decision along with Michael Miscoe, one of the members of council, and that in somehow that was designed to create additional legal fees for my firm.

In -- in particular -- and, we objected to the scandalous impertinent material that is identified in those paragraphs because it has absolutely nothing to go to the subject matter of the -- of the action taken. We believe it violates Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(2) because it contains scandalous and impertinent material that must be stricken and is immaterial and inappropriate to the cause of action.

Paragraph 16 of his notice of appeal characterized the nature of the discussions on easement as being championed by me and Mr. Miscoe. The Borough Solicitor,

Judge, has no vote and therefore as a matter of law no participation in the vote on September the 9th, 2009, which is the subject of the appeal. Any allegations relative to the champion of that — there clearly was the presentation made of this interlocutory order to the Borough Council and discussions that took place; but, as far as having anything to do with my participation, it's totally irrelevant to the proceeding.

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venom that is being spewed by some of these parties relative to this, is it contends that the filing of the litigation that they filed was the result of the ratification vote that created a conflict of interest or appearance of conflict of interest because Mr. Miscoe, who is an attorney, does independent contract work for my firm from time to time.

It goes so far, however, to show the -- the

Let me back up. We have -- before anything was ever done relative to Mr. Miscoe being engaged by my firm to do anything, there was an ethics evaluation done in an opinion letter that has been offered by the evidence commission relative to what interaction he could have with my firm. The opinion letter has been posted on the website. It has been known by Borough Council, and it has -- does not participate in any fashion with any matters dealing with Indian Lake. Mr. Miscoe does nothing -- I have him do legal research -- participates in any manner with my firm.

It has nothing to do with the Borough of Indian Lake.

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But, in any event, Mr. Ging indicates that Mr. Miscoe who is a council member and I apparently had control over the litigation because, by the fact that the Borough Council voted in favor of ratification of that vote, that that somehow was designed to recognize that there would be additional litigation and, because the additional litigation would somehow generate additional fees to my firm and as a result of that, that that somehow makes the action inappropriate. Judge, I think that is so patently frivolous and immaterial that those allegations need to be stricken.

Now, getting back to the merits, let me first start off by saying that we do not believe, and we set forth in our -- in our brief, that this is not an adjudication. The re--- the remand and the vote back to Borough Council is not an adjudication as identified under the local agency law. It specifically talks about what an adjudication would be, and it must demonstrate that in this particular case there is no direct immediate impact upon Mrs. Takacs who is the appellant in this case. She has no greater rights than any other person in the borough relative to the actions taken on that particular occasion.

Now, she has filed an amended complaint or amended appeal to try to cure the issues that are raised about

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the fact that the case law indicates that is not an adjudication. Not every action taken by the Borough results in a local agency standing from the standpoint of an adjudication. She's raised in her new appeal simply identifying or refiling the same appeal she filed before with the exception of adding a couple different paragraphs or sentences to the paragraphs.

One is she contends that the easement encroaches on the riparian rights of the appellant to the use of the land. Now, understand, she has complete access to the water from riparian rights and from her entire shoreline. This easement area is located off of her property.

Now, Mr. Ging in a creative manner is attempting to draw a line from her property directly out into the water and, because the line is not perpendicular to the shoreline and it goes at an angle, that he believes her riparian rights continue to expand as it goes out into the water.

If that's the case, he has riparian rights to the entire lake; and, that's certainly not the case.

There is nothing that impedes the shoreline of the Takacs property because of the actions taken by the easement.

He also contends, without any type of verification or a -- or support, that this would create a

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private nuisance in that there would be noise, disruption, excessive light, increased smell from exhaust of personal watercrafts and boat docks on the property, and a diminution of her property value.

That appears to be -- and, the only other paragraph that has a specific reference is that there essentially is a de facto taking of her property values when she purchased the property in an R-1 area.

Judge, we contend first of all that that does not give them rise to reach standing upon as an adjudication. If they feel that they have a private nuisance claim, they have every right to pursue a private nuisance claim and attempt to prove the things they just alleged; but, by simply referencing it as a bold fact that there would be an increase in smell or an increase in sound or an increase in noise, that somehow that gives her standing relative to the remand that occurred because of the adjudication, we believe it does not raise to the level based on the cases we had identified as to what is an adjudication.

And, I don't -- I don't -- I don't know if
the Court has read the briefs yet or not, but I certainly
don't think I need to read the cases directly; but, it does
specifically indicate that an individual must demonstrate
that she is, he or she is, aggrieved and they can only
establish that by showing that there is a substantial direct

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 and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.

It is not sufficient to claim that they're aggrieved to simply assert the common interests of all citizens in procuring a grievance to the law, and we don't believe there is any violation to the law; but, certainly, every property owner would have access over the entire body of water.

Now, beyond that, beyond the question as to whether she has standing, Your Honor -- and the only order entered is that we're going to stop some of this litigation and recognize that she does have standing from an adjudication standpoint, but she attempts to relitigate again the question that was raised in 860 Civil 2009.

In her appeal, she again challenges that there was a violation of the borough code by the granting of this easement both in 2007 and now with the 2009 ratification.

The Court has already determined that that is -- there was no violation of the borough code, and there is a final adjudication of that.

She also raises again the exact same argument relative to a violation of the administrative law by contending that the Borough violated administrative law by granting easement in 2007 and by re-ratifying that in 2009.

Judge, we believe that she is collaterally estopped to assert those claims in this new action. Those

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have already been adjudicated. There is nothing new that she's added relative to those claims, and the filing of those is frivolous in that there has already been a complete adjudication of those matters.

The next issue that she raises in her appeal is a question that somehow she has been deprived of equal protection of the law and that there was either a private nuisance or a de facto condemnation. Let me back -- go over those backwards.

had a diminution in property because of the action taken by the Borough and that there was a de facto taking, the procedure is not an appeal of that action. The procedure is under the eminent domain code, and there is provisions to determine if in fact there is damages as a result of that action. That is the exclusive remedy in an eminent domain proceeding and a de facto condemnation.

nuisance, she must demonstrate the facts of the private nuisance and address those individuals who wish the nuisance would -- would be -- be generated not by the mere fact that there had been an action taken by Borough Council granting permissive use of land under its water that is identical to easements that have been granted for other occasions such as commercial activities. The marina that is on Indian Lake also

has an easement of the same nature. The private individuals 1 2 have permissive use to put docks on their waterway. Now, she raises the distinction that there is 3 some type of equal protection argument, that she is being 4 treated differently than everyone else. Well, the fact of 5 6 the matter is she's not. All private property owners have permissive use to put a dock on their shoreline. 7 Commercial individuals -- and, she has never 8 9 applied for a commercial dock permit; but, the only two areas that are identified on the lake for commercial purposes are 10 01:28 11 the easement that has been granted here relative to the use of docks for back lots and the marina that is identified in 12 13 another portion of the lake where there actually is the selling and maintaining and the use of -- of boats and so on 14 15 and so forth. 16 THE COURT: So, there is a recorded easement 17 for the marina --18 MR. RULLO: That's correct. -- to place its docks --THE COURT: 19 20 MR. RULLO: That's correct, and --01:29 21 THE COURT: -- similar to the one that you 22 have attached or is attached to these pleadings for a boat 23 dock easement? MR. RULLO: There -- there is a -- my 24 understanding is there is a -- a dock -- there is a easement 25

for the use of the marina in a commercial nature in the same manner in which there is an easement for this particular location.

Now, they use it for the sale of -- of even portions -- people that buy what is called a general license where they may come onto the -- they may not be a property owner in Indian Lake, but they buy a general permit for the use of that particular season; and, there are so many general permits that are issued per year.

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They also have the ability to use it for their own purposes, for their own maintenance purposes. They have maintenance vehicles that or maintenance boats. They go out and work on people's docks; and, they also have a sale of petroleum and those kinds of things on that particular marina. This is not the same commercial type of marina that is being proposed. This is simply the building of docks in which people from back lots would have the ability to place their — their boat on the waterline.

But, she is not a commercial -- she does not intend to be leasing it to others. This is -- and, she has every right and has always had the right to put a boat dock on the shoreline immediately adjacent to her property. So, there is -- there is no distinction insofar as her ability to have access to the waterway, and we have not intended to impair her ability to have access to the waterway.

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THE COURT: If it was a policy or under the police power a grant that private residences had permissive uses, why did you need an easement in this case --

MR. RULLO: Yes.

THE COURT: -- for a commercial? Couldn't you just have said we are giving a permissive use for a commercial dock?

MR. RULLO: Judge, the reason that happened -- and, we need to almost roll back the clock to 2007 and try to discuss that because it came up in the executive session that gave rise to the action taken.

A few days before -- I don't have exactly how many days, but a few days before, we were here on the argument relative to the ordinance itself, the Ordinance 144; and, as part of that discussion, there was an argument that was being made that in somehow the lake itself was not separately zoned. And -- and, that's true. In that particular ordinance, that -- that waterway, unlike, just unlike every other lake in Somerset County, if you look at it, there is not a specific zoning for the bed of the water, the land under the water, even though there is a new ordinance that is being considered which we will identify. And, for the purpose of this purpose, I can let you know that they're in the process of amending the Ordinance 144 -- it's still under review -- which will include the identification of a municipal lake as part of the zoning

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ordinance even though we don't believe it has any bearing, bearing on this or the other lawsuit.

But, one of the things that was argued is that, even though Ordinance 144 specifically identified the location of how far out the dock could go -- in this particular section, it could go out no more than 70 feet on one section; and, because of the -- of the regression in the shoreline, it could go out 50 feet on one portion and 70 feet on the other portion, that that -- that that somehow in the zoning ordinance reflected something that occurred on land that was not in the zoning ordinance itself, that was not zoned.

So, that discussion came up and said, okay, those arguing that there should, there should be some control over the land and there is no ordinance that specifically addresses that, in the executive session, it was discussed that if that's -- if that's an issue now, we'll take that off the table, grant permissive use by way of an easement, and that removes that issue altogether because nobody is saying we don't own the land. We clearly own the land; and, if we wanted to grant it by way of an -- an easement, we'd prepare the document, record it, and that becomes the end of that issue.

Unfortunately, it became a bigger issue because now they're raising somehow that that is a gift which

16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SOMERSET, PENNSYLVANIA 1 it is not a gift. There is no transfer of title. The title 2 still remains in Indian Lake Borough and will remain in 3 Indian Lake Borough, and it is no different than the permissive use that she has and the other 200 docks that are 4 out there or more. 6 So, that's how it came about. It came about 7 as a spin-off of the discussion that there's nothing in -- in the ordinance itself that talks about the fact that the land under the water is regulated. So, because of that, that was the only reason they took the action that they did. to try to take it off, take it off the table, so it was no longer an argument as to whether it was in the zoning

> THE COURT: Okay.

of doing it that way, Judge.

Because we -- we didn't do MR. RULLO: anything as far as identifying the location that is different than is in the zoning ordinance itself that specifically authorized the -- the use of docks in that particular location, so it didn't expand it beyond the area that was identified in -- in that section of the ordinance.

ordinance or not in the zoning ordinance. Now, it still is

the subject of your review, but -- but that was the purpose

So, all in all, if I can, Judge, to boil it all down, we believe this continues to be the frivolous natures in which they continue to pursue these claims. They

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assert claims that we don't believe have any merit and attempt to relitigate matters that have already been litigated; and, we believe to continue to allow this case to continue through a discovery process, Judge, would only incur additional expenses that are unnecessary.

So, at a minimum, we would ask -- oh, one other thing I didn't mention, but I think I do need to mention: I also raised the pure procedural nature of the lawsuit.

This is an appeal that was filed; and, Mr. Ging when he originally filed it at 1122 Civil 2009 attached a certificate of service to his -- his appeal. If you look at the certificate of service, it says that he certifies a true and correct copy of the appeal was served on October the 8th, 2009, at Indian Lake Borough by first-class mail postage to be paid.

9th, so he would have attempted to -- he would have served something before it even was filed. And, I can represent to the Court that there was nothing sent to Indian Lake Borough by Mr. Ging. He actually mailed it to me. I'm the one who has the copy that was mailed, dated October of '0--- that was sent on the 9th. There has never been an original service of this appeal.

Now, he raises in his brief that we've waived

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 !	1	any jurisdictional issue, but I filed in my preliminary
Í	2	objections and specifically said that we've raised the
	3	question as to whether or not there was an appropriate filing,
	4	an appropriate verified appeal and whether or not there was
	5	appropriate original process served.
	6	So, if you look at the docket, you'll see
	7	that the docket shows that this appeal would have been filed
	8	October the 9th. There is nothing that ever demonstrates that
	9	there was original process served.
01:36	10	THE COURT: Does the copy that was served upon
	11	you have a recorder's
	12	MR. RULLO: No, sir.
:: {	13	THE COURT: Prothonotary's time, time
	14	stamp?
	15	MR. RULLO: Actually, what happened and I
	16	think what Mr. Ging did is he mailed a copy to me the same
	17	time he did to the Prothonotary.
	18	I found out about the Case Number of 1122
	19	Civil 2009 by going to the Prothonotary's office and pulling
01:36	20	the original and seeing it. I don't have the time-stamped
	21	copy that shows that there was an appeal filed, and there's no
	22	original process ever been filed upon us.
	23	THE COURT: Thank you very much. Attorney
	24	Ging?
\	25	MR. GING: May it please the Court, Your

22.

Honor, having argued a number of Indian Lake matters before, I do know that the Court reads the briefs ahead of time and is familiar with the issues. So, I'm not going to reiterate all the issues that we put in our brief.

Initially, Your Honor, with respect to Mr.

Rullo's procedural arguments as to original process and as

to the verification affidavit, if the Court thinks the

verification affidavit is necessary, give us the right to

amend; and, we'll put a verification affidavit on the notice

of appeal, but what Mr. Rullo doesn't appreciate, Your Honor,

is that this is an administrative appeal. This is not a civil

action as defined in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

I'd like to invite the Court's attention to Rule 1001 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule says that the rules apply to actions in equity, actions in assumpsit and actions in trespass and that procedurally all of those rules would be construed under the same rules.

The administrative agency law has a specific set of rules and regulations contained in that law and does not require verification, does not require service of process; and, in fact, Your Honor, I'll invite the Court's attention to Page 16 of my brief and a case decided by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania that clearly contradicts Mr. Rullo's understanding of the law.

In Airo, A-I-R-O, Die, D-I-E, Casting, Inc.

versus Westmoreland County Board of Assessment Appeals, the

Commonwealth Court said an appeal to the Common Pleas Court

does not constitute original process so as to require personal

service by the Sheriff. It said that, if the municipality

received actual notice within 30 days of the mailing date,

that -- that that was sufficient.

And, in this case, Mr. Rullo is absolutely correct when we mailed the notice of appeal to the Prothonotary, we mailed a copy to him. He has had actual notice of the proceeding. He's here in court today.

The Borough's subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Court by appearing. He didn't appear by special objection to challenge the jurisdiction which is a procedure that would be available to him if he challenged the Court's jurisdiction. So, they've waived their jurisdictional arguments.

Your Honor, Mr. Rullo -- the thrust of his argument appears to be that my client doesn't have standing, and this is an argument that he's raised in virtually every one of the Indian Lake cases; and, this is filed with special care to amend our notice of appeal to show where she did have standing.

When we over-allege standing as we did here, we're criticized because our pleading is characterized as being the wrong pleading, the wrong forum. Judge, I know

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Title 26 of Purdon's deals with eminent domain. I know what the procedures are for a de facto taking. We're not asking for money damages in this case. We're not saying that the Court award damages to my clients.

What we're saying is it has had an impact that constitutes a de facto taking by diminishing her property.

This gives her standing to challenge -- she's an aggrieved party -- to challenge that action.

Similarly, Your Honor, I don't know many attorneys that have tried private nuisance cases before a Jury in Pennsylvania, but I have; and, I understand the elements of a private nuisance case. I understand it has to be brought as an action in trespass in the Court of Common Pleas.

We're not asking this Court to enjoin a nuisance. We're saying that in creation of this commercial boat dock and in the tailgate atmosphere that goes with it has created a private nuisance for my client, thus giving her standing.

Similarly, Your Honor, I understand where equal protection arguments are brought and how they're brought, but this is another reason why she has standing to bring this appeal.

Mr. Rullo also indicates that these issues have previously been determined by the Court. And,

procedurally, Your Honor, we're in a bit of a conundrum because the Court has entered a final order as a result of the status report filed by the Borough in this case, indicating that it ratified the action where the Court ruled as a matter of law that they violated the sunshine law.

So, we understand that that case was decided by the Court, and we understand what the Court's ruling was; but, we don't understand whether the Court ruled based on the facts of the case, based on whatever it is that the Court did, why it didn't violate the administrative agency law and why it didn't violate the Borough Code.

The Court has recently ruled us to file a 1925 statement of matters complained of. I think it's due next week. We delivered that to the Court. The Court, in response to that statement of matters complained of, will likely write an opinion indicating why it decided the way it did.

If the Court finds based on that case that these issues are covered by that adjudication, then to the extent that the same issues are present we would be collaterally estopped; and, I understand that.

Even there, Your Honor, Mr. Rullo has improperly raised collateral estoppel as a preliminary objection. Collateral estoppel, clearly under the rules, is to be raised as an affirmative defense even if the rules did

1 apply.

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So, procedurally, he's not entitled to file preliminary objections to an appeal from an administrative agency, and he's not entitled to file a preliminary objection in the nature of collateral estoppel. And, the case law on that says, Your Honor, that if someone objects to collateral estoppel being raised as a preliminary objection, the Court doesn't decide it. If we didn't object, the Court could decide it, but we have objected to that.

THE COURT: Isn't your prior action also a local agency law appeal?

MR. GING: It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, this one is a second local agency law appeal?

MR. GING: It is.

THE COURT: What new action did the Borough take for which you are entitled to raise new issues?

MR. GING: Well, Your Honor, what -- what happened -- and, again, Mr. Rullo sort of misstates the nature of our pleading on this. We went to the Borough Council meeting with a proposal of our own. And, when Mr. Rullo says the Borough doesn't give easements in front of other people's property, if you'll look at the diagram attached to our notice of appeal, it clearly shows that they have given an easement in front of the Takacs property.

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He says, well, we drew a line parallel to our property line, not perpendicular; but, if you'll look at that map, the easement they gave to Mr. St. Clair was a perpendicular.

What they did at the meeting where the easement was to be ratified, Your Honor, was they took a vote; and, the vote would have been a tie vote but for the vote of Mr. Miscoe.

Now, I didn't attempt to disparage Mr. Rullo by suggesting that the sole reason for them doing this was to make his -- his law firm more money. What I suggested was the position that Mr. Miscoe's in with Borough Council and Mr. Rullo's law firm put him in a position where we believe -- and, I believe that right now -- that there is a conflict of interest that should have precluded him from voting on this matter. Had he abstained because of the conflict of interest, then the vote wouldn't have passed, an easement wouldn't have passed, we wouldn't be here today. So, we're in a different procedural posture.

And, to say that this is scurrilous and slanderous information, Your Honor, I invite the Court's attention to the minutes of the meeting that constitute the status report when Mr. Vogel, a member of the Borough Council, raised that exact issue. He said, Mr. Miscoe, you shouldn't be voting on this because you work for Mr. Rullo's law firm.

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Now, to the extent that Dan suggests that we're saying they took the action so that they would make more money, that's not what we're saying, Your Honor. This, this case has been litigated before this Court on four or five different occasions, different issues; and, I think that Mr. Miscoe was well aware when he voted, that if they voted in favor of the easement, that we would take an appeal.

So, you have a different procedural posture where we went in to the Borough. We asked for the same treatment that they had given to Mr. St. Clair, were denied that treatment. Our offer wasn't even put to a vote.

And, in terms of Mr. Rullo and Mr. Miscoe championing the easement, Judge, they run the meeting. They -- they guide the discussion. They conducted the discussion as they wanted. They were the primary advocates of the easement during the meeting. And -- and, I believe that it is a conflict of interest for Mr. Miscoe to have voted, particularly where they may not have known that additional litigation would result, Your Honor, but there's a substantial chance that litigation would result.

So, procedurally, we're in a situation where I believe that if Mr. Miscoe wouldn't have voted -- the vote was, I believe, 3-2 or 3-3, whatever the vote was -- I don't think it would have passed, and we wouldn't be here today. So, that's a different procedural issue.

1 THE COURT: How do you view the statement by 2 Attorney Rullo that there has been an ethics commission review 3 of any relationship he has with the Barbera law firm to 4 understand that it excludes anything dealing with Indian Lake Borough matters? Even in the face of that which I understand 5 he just said -- I don't know if it is -- is posted on the 6 7 website, were you aware that that review had been completed? 8 MR. GING: I was, Your Honor. In fact, Mr. 9 Miscoe -- when Mr. Vogel raised the fact that he felt there 10 was a conflict of interest, Mr. Miscoe said, well, Dan's law 01:47 11 firm won't make any more money, so it's not a conflict. 12 that was basically what he told the Borough Council. 13 If I would have been the Solicitor, I would 14 have told Mr. Miscoe, hey, this looks bad. This just doesn't 15 look right. Don't vote. Let's not have the appearance of 16 impropriety. 17 And, in the ethics commission ruling, Your 18 Honor, on -- on this issue, I think you could go either way. 19 The question is: Is it credible for Mr. Miscoe to indicate 20 that or for Mr. Miscoe to vote and think, well, this won't 01:48 21 result in any additional litigation? If he truly believes that, honestly believes 22 23 that, after all that's gone on with Indian Lake Borough and

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additional litigation is going to occur, then maybe he's okay

the St. Clair zoning ordinance and everything else, that no

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on that; but, Your Honor, it's not just the propriety of the act itself. It's the appearance of impropriety that was addressed by another member of the Borough Council. I was at the meeting. I didn't find the response was satisfactory so that that is an issue in this case that's different than the issues in the other case.

I just finished a brief on res judicata, Your Honor. I have a case which is the eighth in a series of litigation trying to determine timber rights. The case has been to the Federal District Court twice, to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals twice, to the Common Pleas Court in Warren County and Superior Court twice; and, I understand the concept of res judicata.

And, if the Court in its upcoming opinion in the underlying action or the prior action determines that for the reasons we have in this appeal it's barred by res judicata with the administrative agency law -- for instance, if the Court determines that there was not an adjudication, and the Court can determine that. The Court could say I don't think that's an adjudication. Now, based on Mr. Rullo's argument, we don't have standing and therefore it's not an adjudication, I think the Court could very easily say, yeah, this lady's a next-door neighbor. It interferes with her property. She does have standing. If the Court finds she has standing, the act has to be an adjudication.

Mr. Rullo argues in his brief, well, this isn't an adjudicatory act. And, if you look at the cases we've cited in our brief, Your Honor, sometimes the Borough engages in legislative acts, sometimes it engages in adjudicatory acts; and, where the rights of a person are affected as we've established in this case, it's an adjudicatory act.

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So, not every act of the Borough Council is a legislative act; and, if the Court finds an adjudication, then I think we can go forward in this case. If the Court finds it's not an adjudication, then it's not an adjudication now; and, we're going to have to resolve that in Commonwealth Court.

Another thing, Your Honor: We have to take this appeal because, if we don't take the appeal, if we fail to raise issues that have an impact, we'll later be considered to have failed to exhaust our administrative remedies.

Mr. Rullo suggests, well, we should go into equity and get an injunction; we should file an eminent domain case.

If we went into equity, Your Honor, and asked this Court for an injunction against the Borough, Mr. Rullo'd come in and say, oh, but, Judge, they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; they could appeal under the administrative agency law. So, we're in a conundrum here in

terms of protecting my client's rights.

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With respect to the Borough Code, I've argued a number of things in the underlying case, first of all, that before the Borough could transfer this property, it had to either bid or appraise. If the Court decides that that argument is not persuasive and therefore not a violation of the Borough Code, then this is probably res judicata; but, if the Court decides as we've argued in this case that the Borough doesn't have the authority to grant an easement, period, then that — that would have an impact on that, on this case.

And, that's what we have argued here, Your Honor. I know that the Borough Code has stated that the Borough has the property to lease or sell property, period. The Borough has no greater powers than that granted to it by the Borough Code. It doesn't have power to grant easements under the Borough Code. I've not been able to find any cases where the Courts have said sell or lease means grant an easement; and, I think by way of analogy, Your Honor, it is basically a sale of property.

Now, Mr. Rullo argues, well, it's permissive use just like everybody else has. Well, it's not, Your Honor, because the permissive use is granted under the police law. It's under the zoning ordinance. People are given the right to go into the lake under the zoning ordinance. The Borough

can change the zoning ordinance at any time. As Mr. Rullo 1 2 indicated, they're doing that again. They're creating a new 3 special St. Clair zone. Once again --MR. RULLO: I object to that, Judge. 4 5 object. 6 THE COURT: I agree. MR. GING: All right. Well --7 THE COURT: Let's try and keep it on a civil 8 9 basis. 10 MR. GING: They're -- they're -- they're 01:53 11 adopting a new ordinance, Your Honor, and, you know, 12 basically, they can take away my client's permissive use to 13 the lake in that ordinance. The easement, to the contrary, 14 they can't take back. It's a perpetual easement. 15 We've cited the case of the cell tower in 16 our brief wherein the Court considered whether that was a 17 conveyance or a lease and found that, even though the term of 18 the lease was lengthy, it was renewable for three terms, three 19 successive terms, that it was a lease; and, that's the case 20 that Dan cited in his brief. 01:53 21 It doesn't apply here because we're not 22 talking about a lease. We're talking about an easement. So, 23 depending on what the Court decides in the first case, I 24 think -- and, I think it's premature for the Court to decide 25 this case is barred by res judicata until the Court writes its

opinion in the other case; and, if the Court writes its 1 opinion in a manner that makes that case res judicata, the 2 Court dismisses this case, we've protected our appellate 3 rights, and we can go forward; but, I think at this point in 4 time, Your Honor, it's premature for a decision on whether or 5 not that matter is res judicata.

And, depending on how the Court decides, it may very well be, and I'm not going to stand here and argue, oh, no, it's not res judicata. I mean, the parties are the Most of the issues are the same. There are other issues that weren't raised in the initial notice of appeal. Most of the elements of res judicata are there but may not be once the Court makes its decision.

Mr. Rullo indicated that the Borough doesn't sell or lease property in front of other people's property, Your Honor, and we've shown on the map that that's what happened here.

And, in -- I'd like to suggest to the Court that Mr. Rullo also argued that Mrs. Takacs can put a dock in front of her property; but, if she puts it in the area in front of her property that's covered by the easement, Mr. St. Clair then has a right of action against her.

In terms of the other marina, Your Honor, that marina as I recall was a marina that was constructed at Indian Lake Borough by the original private developer; and, it was

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there and grandfathered in long before there was an Indian 1 Lake Borough. It's a different circumstance entirely, and --2 and it's not an area that was recently zoned commercial and 3 4 granted an easement. Another thing, Your Honor: 5 In terms of standing, and I need to back up a little on this, when my 6 7 client purchased her property, this area was not zoned the way that it is today and commercial boat docks were not a 8 realistic anticipation for her at that time. 9 10 She bought a home in a residential area. 01:56 was aware when she bought it that the property next to her 11 could not be perked, most likely wouldn't be developed, and 12 bought three lots in that area because of the serenity and 13 14 peace. 15 THE COURT: She bought a property next to an area that was zoned commercial-recreational and/or commercial-16 17 recreation hotel, that had a hotel on it. MR. GING: It did, but the --18 THE COURT: You don't think that she could 19 20 anticipate that the hotel would utilize its property to have 01:56 21 some kind of commercial activity with the water? MR. GING: Well, Your Honor, traditionally, it 22 23 had been used for a ski slope. THE COURT: Well, that hadn't been for 24 25 20 years.

MR. GING: No, I agree, Your Honor, but the 1 anticipation that the Borough Council would pass a new zoning 2 ordinance along the commercial docks there -- commercial docks 3 have approximately 40 boats. I don't think realistically 4 anybody could have anticipated that at the time she purchased 5 6 that property. THE COURT: What part of commercial didn't she 7 8 get? MR. GING: Well, Your Honor, they --9 10 THE COURT: She could have put a -- they could 01:57 have had a McDonald's down by the water. 11 MR. GING: Well, Your Honor, I can't imagine 12 Indian Lake Borough giving a building permit to a McDonald's. 13 THE COURT: We're not here to imagine. We're 14 15 here to argue what their rights were. MR. GING: I understand, Your Honor. And, you 16 17 know, when -- when my clients purchased the property, there was a lodge there. The lodge had opened and closed over the 18 There was a golf course. There was an apartment 19 20 building or a hotel there. 01:57 21 No one ever anticipated that all the trees on their property line would be cut down, that there would be 22 townhouses put in next to them, because that had never been 23 the use that was made. So, I think they had a right to rely 24

upon what they believed the Zoning Ordinance 99 provided at

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1 that location. 2 And, I don't believe there was anything else 3 that that -- I don't believe there's anything else, Your 4 Honor, unless --5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. MR. GING: -- does the Court have any 6 7 questions? 8 THE COURT: I was going to give Attorney Rullo 9 a chance for rebuttal and you a chance for surrebuttal, if you 01:58 10 wish. 11 MR. GING: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 MR. RULLO: Very short rebuttal, Judge, on a 13 couple of things. First, this issue about potential conflict with Mr. Miscoe: Let me just take a moment to talk about 14 15 that. 16 The action taken by the Borough Council was 17 to ratify something that was done in 2007. There is no 18 additional documentation needed to be prepared, that no 19 easement that was to be done, there was nothing my firm would 01:58 20 have done that would generate any additional legal fees. 21 What they're implying is that because they 22 potentially could file a lawsuit that Mr. Miscoe should recuse 23 himself because that may mean the Borough Solicitor would have 24 to defend the action taken by Borough Council. Essentially, 25 if you boil it down, it means that, unless we do what they

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want to do, we -- Mr. Miscoe always has to recuse himself because the potential is that the Solicitor may have to defend it.

Now, even if there was a tie vote doesn't mean it fails. The Mayor has to then break the tie. Mr. Lichty would have had to have then break the tie if Mr. Miscoe would have recused himself; but, the fact of the matter is there was nothing when it was raised by -- by Vogel which his -- Mr. Vogel has been sympathetic to their -- their plight all the way back to the time the zoning ordinance. He testified on behalf of Mr. Lyons and those people during -- before he was even on council.

He always had raised some question about that; but, at this point, he raised the question of whether Mr. Miscoe should recuse himself. And, Mike correctly stated there's no additional legal issues that are going to occur. Mr. Rullo's firm is not going to prepare anything new.

We were defending the Borough's action. The fact that they decided to sue, I can't control them. They are the only ones that control that. And, therefore, Mr. Miscoe can't -- can't anticipate, just because we take action to ratify something we did back in 2007, that somehow he has to recuse himself.

And, this appearance of impropriety is only because Mr. Ging spins it that way. There was no legal

entitlement for him, him -- no legal, legal obligation for him to back off on voting his conscience. He's a -- he's a member of council. He takes an oath to abide the law, and that's what he did.

So, in that sense, there was no prohibition, no conflict of interest, and we had no legal expenses relative to the action taken. It's only because they keep appealing or filing lawsuits that there is additional costs.

And, Mr. Miscoe has nothing to do with my firm relative to Indian Lake Borough matters, and that's clear; and, nobody's ever suggested otherwise.

As to the last issue that he raised about Mrs. Takacs somehow, you know, being impaired by the fact that these -- this easement may occur, understand, Judge, she's been a straw party from day one. I mean, they have only been -- the only reason she's -- she's never at the meetings. She's not here today. She is a straw party.

Mr. Lyons and Mr. -- and other people that may be involved in it are really the key parties behind all of this issue.

But, in any event, when the Takacses bought their property, they bought it next to a commercial, commercial land. There was a commercial pier that was there during that entire period of time, a place called Pow Wow Pier, if you remember reading in the transcript of the zoning issues, that there had always been some ability to use it for

commercial purposes. That was not an owned dock by any individual. It was owned by the developer. So, there has always been some commercial use of all of that land, and you're correct in that it could have been anything from a hotel to a ski resort to a McDonald's to any type of commercial use.

So, she had no right to anticipate that it would not be used for commercial purposes; and, the fact that the docks are being installed or will be installed if the Court affirms the zoning issue would make the whole easement issue moot because the ordinance itself specifically identifies and authorizes that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. GING: May it please the Court, Your Honor, that the conflict of interest is not that Mr. Miscoe works for the Barbera law firm. The conflict of interest is that the Barbera law firm, at least at the time this easement was passed, worked for Mr. St. Clair; and, that's the conflict.

He's a contractor of the Barbera law firm.

They're representing the Borough. They're representing the St. Clair development. In fact, the Court will recall that, at the time the original easement was passed, Mr. St. Clair was the president of Borough Council --

MR. RULLO: Objection.

1 MR. GING: -- and, he did --2 MR. RULLO: Judge, that has nothing to do with 3 this appeal. This appeal deals directly with Mr. Miscoe and 4 the issues on the vote. It does not deal with any previous representation of -- of -- of St. Clair. 5 6 MR. GING: Excuse me. 7 MR. RULLO: That is not the subject -- I'm objecting to that. 8 9 THE COURT: I understand. 10 MR. RULLO: He's raising a whole new issue. 02:03 11 THE COURT: I understand. 12 MR. GING: It's not a new issue, Your Honor. It's putting the issue into perspective. It's not a conflict 13 14 of interest, I don't think that it's a conflict of interest, 15 for Mr. Miscoe to work on Indian Lake matters, I don't 16 necessarily know that we've ever been concerned about. 17 The conflict comes when Mr. Rullo represents 18 St. Clair and the Borough, and Mr. Miscoe is a contractor of 19 the law firm and a president of the Borough Council. That's 20 where we claim to be the conflict, because of that. 02:03 21 As far as Mrs. Takacs being a straw party, 22 Your Honor, there's nothing straw about her ownership of the 23 property immediately adjacent to the St. Clair Resort 24 development property. She's not here today. Mr. Takacs is. 25 He's sitting next to Mr. Lyons. So, to the extent that she's

a straw party, Your Honor, she has the property in her name. for estate planning purposes. Her husband is here. I don't know what that has to do with the case.

In terms of the Pow Wow Pier, Your Honor, if you remember the testimony from the zoning case, the testimony was that, first of all, that was a pier that was used to ferry people from the marina over to the ski lodge or that would pick people up at the ski lodge and take them around the lake. There were one or two boats. It was also 20 years ago. I don't know that it was there when the Takacses purchased the property.

So, to the extent that there was ever a commercial operation there, if there were boats at the Pow Wow Pier a couple times a year, that's very different than 20 jet skis and 20 boats being there for the entire summer.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I appreciate very much the presentation by counsel. I'm going to indicate, first of all, and I'll give some explanation, I'm going to sustain the preliminary objections, and I'm going to dismiss the case as a final order.

And, my rationale is this: You had a prior local agency appeal which listed a number of different issues that you were raising regarding the actions of the Borough in granting an easement.

1 My remand to them was simply that they needed 2 to have that vote in a public forum when there was a proper 3 opportunity for the public to comment. That was the sole remand. 4 5 They did that. There's no change in the action that they did at the second meeting than what they did 6 7 at the first. 8 I don't raise the legal issues that come before the Court. You do. You raised them. 9 That's the 10 02:05 issue that you're going to appeal to the Commonwealth Court, 11 and that's why I'm not going to allow a second local agency 12 appeal. 13 Also, I just want to comment: You Mr. Ging, 14 you Mr. Rullo, are both officers of the Court. I was offended 15 by the language of the appeal which chastised that a member of 16 17 18 19 02:06 20 garner fees. 21 22 23 that we see in the pleading here today. 24

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this Bar would raise issues solely for the purposes of garnering fees and wages. I find that offensive. More so would it be appropriate for Mr. Rullo in his petition to say that you are making these appeals because you're trying to Neither one would be right, and I will not accept it by either of you on the bare and bold allegations So, the ruling of the Court is: This 4th day of December, 2009, the preliminary objections to the local 40

16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SOMERSET, PENNSYLVANIA

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1	agency appeal of Mary Jo Takacs are granted. The case is
2	dismissed with prejudice. This is a final order. All right.
3	MR. RULLO: Thank you, Your Honor.
4	MR. GING: Thank you, Your Honor.
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE:

I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me on the hearing of the above cause, and that this copy is a correct transcript of the same.

Denise J Khorey Harriman, RMR

Official Reporter

16th Judicial District

Date: